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*The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of Bard College Risk  is  commonly  defined  in  negative  terms--the  probability  of  suffering  loss,  or  factors  and  actions  involving 
uncertain  dangers  or  hazards.  In  contrast,  the  definition  used  in  the  social  sciences  relies  on  simply  the  degree  of 
uncertainty--how  much  variance  exists  among  the  possible  outcomes  associated  with  a particular  choice  or  action.  Counter 
to  intuition,  an  investment  that  will  lose  $5  for  certain  would  therefore  be  classified  as  less  risky  than  one  that  has  an 
equal  chance  of  yielding  either  a  gain  of  $10  or  a gain  of  $15.  Uncertainty  and  value  are  treated  as  separable  entities 
because  expanding  the  notion  of  risk  to  include  gains  as  well  as  losses  adds  considerable  conceptual  power.  For  example, 
depending  on  how  a pair  of  options  is  described,  a choice  can  appear  as  if between  two  losses  or  between  two  gains. 
Consider  the  following: 
Problem  I:  Imagine  that  you  are  faced  with  a  life  or  death  choice.  The  U.S.  has  safely  quarantined 
all  600 people  infected  with  an  unusual  virus,  but  is now  certain  that  they  will  all  die  without  some 
treatment.  Resources  are  severely  limited  and  the  choice  mast  be  made  between  two  scienttjk  programs. 
Program  A:  If adopted,  2cO people  will  be  saved  for  certain. 
Program  B: If  adopted, there  is a  IN  probability  that  600 people  will  be  saved  and  a  2/3  probability 
that  no people  will  be  saved. 
People  choose  A  over  B by  a ratio  of  three  to  one,  showing  a  preference  for  the  certain  outcome.  Now  consider  the  same 
scenario  with  a different  set  of  choices. 
Program  C:  if  adopted,  400  people  will  die for  certain. 
Program  D:  If  adopted, there  is a  l/3  probability  that  no people  will  die  and  a  213 
probability  that  600  people  will  die. 
People  choose  D  over  C  by  a  ratio  of  four  to  one,  showing  a preference  for  risk.  However,  note  that  the  end  results  of  A 
and  C  are  exactly  the  same--200  people  alive,  400  dead--as  are  those  of  B and  D.  According  to  classical  theories  of 
rationality,  one  cannot  both  prefer  A  to  B and  D  to  C.  This  paper  will  discuss  why  most  people  do. 
Economic  theories  based  on  “perfect”  rationality  are  undoubtedly  powerful.  If  one  wanted  to  describe  or  predict 
human  behavior  in  the  simplest  possible  manner,  one  would  certainly  want  to begin  by  assuming  (1) that people  are 
motivated  by  their  own  self  interests,  and  (2)  that  they  can  be  extremely  calculating  when  valuable  opportunities  arise, 
learning  quickly  from  the  success  of  others.  Research  on  the  psychology  of  risk  does  not  begin  by  assuming  that  all 
human  behavior  is  irrational,  random,  or  thoughtless.  Rather  this  research  has  centered  on  how  people  may  be  biased  by various  social  influences,  by  the  way  that  they  perceive  the  choices  available,  or  by  the  cognitive  rules  of  thumb  that  they 
use  to  simplify  difficult  decisions. 
I.  SOCIAL  INFLUENCES  ON  JUDGMENTS  OF  RISK  AND  CONTROL 
A.  ILLUSION  OF  CONTROL. 
In  principle,  the  distinction  between  skill  and  luck  would  seem  clear.  Skill  situations  are  characterized  by  a  causal 
link  between  behaviors  and  outcomes.  Success  in  skill  tasks  is  controllable,  whereas  success  in  a chance  activity  is  not. 
Yet  the  distinction  is  often  not  recognized.  ln  a  series  of  essays  and  studies,  Ellen  Langer  showed  how  people  often  treat 
a chance  event  as  if  it  involved  skill  and  was  therefore  under  their  own  control.  Studies  conducted  in  Las  Vegas  casinos 
have  found  that  a dealer  who  experiences  a run  of  bad  luck  risks  losing  his  or  her  job.  Dice  players  often  concentrate 
carefully  on  the  outcomes  they  desire,  throwing  their  dice  harder  when  they  need  higher  numbers  and  tenderly  when  low 
numbers  are  required.  Langer  argued:  “by  encouraging  or  allowing  participants  in  a  chance  event  to  engage  in  behaviors 
that  they  would  engage  in  were  they  participating  in  a  skill  event,  one  increases  the  likelihood  of  inducing  a  skill 
orientation;  that  is,  one  induces  an  illusion  of  control.  By  introducing  choice,  familiarity  with  [the  situation],  active 
involvement,  or  competition  into  a chance  situation  where  people  cannot  influence  the  outcome,  they  will  show  behavior 
more  appropriate  to  a  skill  event.” 
Several  lotteries  conducted  by  Langer  are  telling  as  to  power  of  the  illusion  of  control.  ln  the  first  study,  Langer 
assessed  the  effects  of  choice,  using  randomly  determined  subjects  who  worked  at  two  business  offices  in  which  drawings 
and  sports  pools  were  common.  The  experimental  procedure  was  straightforward.  Potential  customers  were  approached 
and  asked  if  they  would  like  to  buy  a  lottery  ticket.  The  assistant  explained  that  about  fifty  tickets  in  total  were  being 
sold,  each  costing  $1.  They  were  told  the  date  of  the  drawing  that  would  determine  who  won  the  entire  pool.  It  being 
football  season,  the  lottery  tickets  were  two  matched  sets  of  standard  football  cards,  each  card  with  a picture  of  a  famous 
player,  his  name  and  his  team.  Both  sets  were  arranged  first  by  team  and  then  by  the  player’s  name.  After  agreeing  to 
play,  the  first  customer  was  given  one  of  the  sets  and  asked  to  select  one  of  the  cards.  The  customer  named  the  card  so 
that  the  assistant  could  fii  the  matching  card  from  the  other  set,  drop  it  into  a  sealed  carton,  and  make  a note  of  the 
customer’s  name  and  card.  The  next  customer  was  treated  in  the  same  way,  except  that  after  agreeing  to  play,  they  were 
handed  a  card  that  matched  the  choice  of  the  preceding  subject.  Repeating  this  process,  people  were  alternately  placed  in 
2 the  choice  and  the  no  choice  condition.  The  important  test  came  on  the  morning  the  lottery  was  to  be  held.  The  assistant 
approached  each  of  the  customers  individually  and  explained:  “Someone  in  the  other  office  wanted  to  get  into  the  lottery, 
but  since  I’m  not  selling  tickets  any  more,  he  asked  me  if  I’d  find  out  how  much  you’d  sell  your  ticket  for.  It  makes  no 
difference  to  me,  but  how  much  should  I tell  him?” 
Choice  dramatically  increased  the  value  of  the  ticket.  Customers  in  the  choice  condition  required  an  average  of 
$8.67  before  they  would  sell  their  tickets,  in  contrast  to  an  average  of  only  $l.%  in  the  no  choice  condition.  The 
customers  were  oblivious  to  the  effect,  and  not  one  of  the  subjects  was  willing  to  admit  that  either  choosing  or  not 
choosing  their  card  would  have  changed  their  selling  price.  However,  many  states  have  spent  considerable  funds  so  that 
people  playing  the  lottery  would  be  able  to  pick  their  own  numbers. 
In  a  second  study,  Langer  demonstrated  powerful  effects  of  familiarity  on  the  illusion  of  control.  Again  there 
were  two  groups  of  customers.  In  this  study  both  groups  were  allowed  to  choose  their  own  tickets.  However,  one  group 
chose  from  cards  identified  by  numbers,  whereas  the  other  group  chose  from  cards  identified  by  undecipherable 
hieroglyphics.  Customers  holding  cards  with  the  unfamiliar  symbols  agreed  to  sell  back  their  tickets  for  substantially  less 
than  did  those  holding  cards  with  familiar  numbers. 
This  work  would  appear  to  have  several  implications  for  the  psychology  of  investment,  in  which  uncontrollable 
factors  significantly  affect  one’s  final  outcome.  For  example,  research  has  shown  that  people  overestimate  their  own 
control  (i.e.,  underestimate  risk)  when  given  the  opportunity  to  purchase  a  familiar  option.  Because  people  are  generally 
highly  familiar  with  their  own  company,  they  may  be  prone  to under-appreciate  the  full  degree  of  risk  that  occurs  if  they 
concentrate  their  security  holding  in  the  company’s  stock,  as  nearly  half  of  all  individual  investors  do.  Both  their  salary 
and  their  savings  then  depend  upon  the  health  of  a  single  company.  This  research  may  also  help  explain  why  stock 
trading  volume  tends  to  plunge  following  insider  scandals,  as  it did  during  World  War  I,  the  early  193Os,  and  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  1980s.  Langer  showed  that  people  bet  less  against  a dapper,  well  spoken  player  than  against  a player  looking 
disheveled  and  boorish  (in  her  words,  a  “snook”)  even  though  in  both  cases  the  outcomes  of  the  gamble  were  determined 
by  tossing  a  coin.  Realizing  that  one  may  be  facing  more  sophisticated  opponents  is  likely  to  reduce  the  illusion  of 
control,  thus  decreasing  the  ease  with  which  people  will  accept  risk,  even  if  the  disadvantage  is  more  illusory  than  real. 
B.  THE  GROUP  POLARIZATION  EFFECT. 
Among  the  most  famous  studies  in  social  psychology  are  those  that  concern  the  effects  of  groups  on  decisions 
3 concerning  risk.  This  research  began  in  the  early  1960s  using  problems  previously  employed  to  assess  individual 
differences  in  risk  taking.  Each  “choice  dilemma”  described  a  situation  in  which  an  individual  is  presented  with  an  option 
between  a moderately  attractive  certain  alternative,  and  a  risky  one  that  potentially  has  greater  promise.  For  example: 
Problem  2: Bob  is playing  chess  in a  tournament  against  a  much  stronger  player.  If he follows  his 
present  strategy  he  ts certain  to  achieve  a draw.  Suddenly,  Bob  realizes  that  there  is an  alternate  strategy 
that,  tf it succeeds,  will  quickly  win  the  game,  but  will  lead  to  sure  defeat  tf not. 
Imagine  that  you  are  advising  Bob.  Listed  below  are  several  probabilities  of the  alternate  strategy 
working.  Please  check  the  lowest  probability  that  you  would  consider  acceptable  to  make  it worthwhile 
for  Bob  to  choose  the  alternate  strategy. 
fl  I  in  10  that  the  alternate  strategy  will  succeed 
/j  2  in  10  that  the  alternate  strategy  will  succeed 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
fl  9  in  10  that  the  alternate  strategy  will  succeed 
fj  Bob  should  not  choose  the  alternate  strategy,  no  matter  what  the probabilities. 
People  read  the  dilemmas  and  made  their  initial  choices.  Some  subjects  then  met  in  groups,  discussed  the  problems 
among  themselves,  and  again  made  private  choices.  With  the  original  set  of  problems,  after  discussion  a clear  majority  of 
subjects  later  privately  chose  more  risky  options.  Subjects  given  no  chance  to  discuss  did  not  systematically  change  their 
private  views. 
The  effect  of  group  discussion  was  first  called  the  “risky  shift,”  but  continued  work  made  it  clear  that  this  was  an 
incorrect  name.  Some  choice  dilemmas  consistently  produce  caution  shifts.  Such  effects  commonly  occur  when  the  risky 
option  involves  the  possibility  of  ruining  one’s  life,  severely  harming  others,  or  dying.  When  people  are  initially 
conservative,  finding  the  risky  option  acceptable  only  if  its  odds  of  success  are  very  high,  then  after  discussion  they 
become  even  more  conservative,  becoming  even  less  willing  to  accept  w  probability  that  the  risky  option  will  fail.  The 
phenomenon  has  been  more  aptly  named  the  “group  polarization”  effect  because  the  shift  can  be  either  toward  risk  or 
toward  caution,  generally  reflecting  the  initial  biases  of  the  individual  discussants.  Group  discussion  has  been  described 
by  one  European  researcher  as  acting  like  a developer  on  exposed  film:  “it  brings  out  the  picture,  but  the  outcome  is 
predetermined.  ” 
Group  polarization  is  not  due  to  greater  powers  of  leadership  in  those  who  advocate  the  extremes,  or  due  to 
pressures  to  conform.  Rather,  the  polarization  effect  is  caused  by  social  comparison  and  the  number  of  arguments  pro  or 
con  presented  during  discussion.  First,  befor e h earing  the  Positions  of  others,  people  generally  believe  that  they  have 
answered  in  a more  desirable  fashion  than  most  others  would.  Since  not  everyone  can  be  better  than  average,  group 
discussion  generally  provides  people  with  surprising  information  as  to  what  constitutes  a  socially  ideal  level  of  risk  or 
4 caution,  causing  an  impetus  to  polarize  in  the  favored  direction.  Second,  the  initial  individual  leanings  toward  risk  or 
caution  generally  reflect  the  pool  of  arguments  that  will  arise  during  discussion.  Given  that  with  most  problems  not 
everyone  will  have  thought  of  all  of  these  arguments,  the  difference  between  the  number  of  arguments  in  favor  or  against 
risk  is  likely  to  widen  during  discussion,  favoring  the  initially  preferred  pole.  People  are  strongly  swayed  by  new 
arguments  in  favor  of  a particular  position.  As  one  would  expect,  little  movement  is  caused  by  discussion  of  highly 
familiar  issues. 
Two  findings  regarding  group  polarization  may  be  particularly  relevant  to  financial  investments.  First,  research 
has  shown  that  the  direction  of  the  shift  due  to discussion  depends  on  the  magnitude  of  the  investment.  After  discussion, 
people  become  more  risky  with  small  stakes,  but  more  conservative  when  the  stakes  are  large.  Second,  the  shift  toward 
risk  due  to  discussion  has  been  found  to  increase  as  the  difference  between  the  expected  return  of  the  risky  alternative  and 
the  certain  outcome  expands.  Combining  these  two  findings,  one  would  expect  that  the  acceptability  of  a  small  position  in 
a high-growth,  high-risk  instrument  is  likely  to  rise  after  an  investor  is  given  time  to  “talk  it  over.  ” 
C.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  MOOD 
The  accepted  psychiatric  description  of  mania  includes  not  only  elevated  mood,  self-esteem  and  energy,  but  also 
“excessive  involvement  in  pleasurable  activities  that  have  a high  potential  for  painful  consequences,  [such  as]  buying 
sprees,...  and  foolish  business  investments.  *  These  symptoms  aptly  describe  those  shown  across  much  of  England  during 
the  South  Sea  Bubble  of  the  1700s  and  the  U.S.  during  the  1920s.  (Clinical  wisdom  is  that  a  manic  must  never  be  given  a 
credit  card.)  Similarly,  economic  depressions  share  the  common  clinical  symptoms  of  indecisiveness,  apathy,  and  loss  of 
energy.  Because  many  factors  act  so  as  to  affect  people’s  moods  at the  aggregate  level,  the  clinical  literature  on  mania 
and  depression  can  help  predict  aggregate  changes  in  investment  preferences. 
People  strive  to  nurture  positive  moods.  Consequently,  elevated  mood  causes  steeper  demand  functions  for 
increasingly  positive  returns  and  for  greater  probabilities  of  return.  Surprisingly,  research  has  also  shown  that  elevated 
moods  are  also  characterized  by  a greater  propensity  to  buy  insurance  against  large  losses.  Positive  moods  are  something 
people  are  willing  to  pay  to  protect.  However,  positive  moods  reduce  the  extent  to  which  people  accurately  assess  their 
own  exposure  to  risk.  Positive  mood  states  lead  people  to  examine  fewer  of  the  variables  related  to  a particular  decision, 
to  pick  these  variables  more  quickly,  and  to  process  these  few  pieces  of  information  more  thoroughly.  The  three  effects 
lead  to  overconfidence  in  their  own  decisions,  because  contradictory  information  is  less  likely  to  be  uncovered  and  any 
5 that  does  arise  is  more  likely  to  be  assimilated.  Positive  moods  induce  the  illusion  of  control,  causing  people  to  have  great 
difftculty  recognizing  when  the  connection  between  their  own  actions  and  any  rewards  they  receive  is  missing.  Manics 
credit  themselves  for  all  good  things  that  happen.  In  contrast,  depressives  do  not  suffer  from  this  illusion,  and  are  readily 
able  to  distinguish  between  circumstances  in  which  their  actions  are  effective  and  those  in  which  they  are  not.  Negative 
mood  states  lead  to  an  exhaustive  examination  of  the  variables,  and  to  very  long  decision  times. 
At  the  aggregate  level,  positive  moods  would  be  expected  to draw  people  toward  high  risk  investments.  By 
examining  fewer  of  the  potentially  important  sources  of  information  available,  investors  are  more  likely  to  fail  to  realize 
the  complexity  of  the  information  that  must  be  mastered  to  successfully  employ  a  given  asset.  In  contrast,  negative  mood 
states  at  the  aggregate  levels  increase  the  likelihood  that  investors  become  unable  to  make  decision,  becoming  paralyzed 
while  attempting  to  process  all  of  the  complex  information  available.  General  dysphoria  is  also  likely  to  increase 
investors’  willingness  to  accept  low  rates  of  return. 
D.  INTRINSIC  MOTIVATION 
What  is  the  underlying  motivation  for  actions  that  occur  even  when  there  are  no  immediately  compelling  external 
or  physiological  forces?  What  causes  intrinsic  motivation  to  persist  or  diminish. 7  There  are  two  common  characteristics 
of  freely  chosen  activities.  First,  by  engaging  in  the  behavior,  the  individual  must  gain  some  opportunity  to  evaluate  his 
or  her  performance.  Second,  the  behavior  must  be  freely  chosen,  and  not  forced  by  some  extrinsic  threat  or  promised 
reward.  Surveillance,  deadlines,  and  rigidly  held  standards  and  requirements  all  significantly  reduce  the  extent  to  which 
people  will  engage  in  an  activity  if  left  to  themselves.  These  simple  facts  can  explain  some  seemingly  paradoxical 
behavior.  For  example,  blood  donation  in  England  actually  increased  when  hospitals  stopped  paying  for  blood.  Payment 
reduced  the  extent  to  which  people  could  provide  themselves  with  positive  feedback,  defining  their  gift  as  having  been  a 
moral  act  untainted  by  extrinsic  control.  Similarly,  in  the  196Os, families  covered  by  private  pension  plans  voluntarily 
saved  greater  amounts  of  money  than  families  that  were  not.  (Controls  were  included  for  age,  income  level,  geographical 
area,  and  the  like.)  The  former  did  not  need  to  save  to  enjoy  a comfortable  retirement,  and  could  enjoy  their  increasing 
their  savings  as  a freely  chosen  positive  behavior. 
Drawing  upon  this  work,  several  factors  would  seem  likely  to  increase  investors’  intrinsic  motivation  to  change 
their  investments.  First,  the  initial  decision  to  invest  may  be  facilitated  if  people  understand  that  their  financial  position 
does  not  reouire  them  to  make  these  investments,  but  rather  that  it  is  a  freedom  that  their  financial  situation  provides. Second,  investors  may  become  more  motivated  to  trade  to  the  extent  that  they  believe  that  doing  so  is  likely  to  provide 
them  with  meaningful  performance  feedback,  information  which  allows  them  to  assess  and  improve  their  own  skills.  To 
receive  such  feedback,  investors  need  to believe  that  they  personally  have  actively  made  informed  choices,  because  then 
they  will  be  able  to  attribute  their  performance  to  themselves  and  not  to  others  or  to  luck.  Several  theorists  have  argued 
that  investors  use  full  service  brokers  so  that  they  can  have  someone  else  to blame  if  the  investment  goes  bad.  ln  fact, 
investment  advise  may  be  sought  so  that  people  feel  informed  enough  to  be  able  to  blame  themselves. 
II.  DECISION  THEORY:  UTILITY  AND  PROBABILITY 
A.  AXIOMATIC  MODERN  UTILITY  THEORY 
Decision  theories  seek  to  describe  how  people  should  choose  among  sets  of  potential  outcomes.  These  theories 
were  first  constructed  when  French  nobles  in  the  18th  Century  called  on  their  court  mathematicians  for  help  in  playing 
cards  and  dice.  We  begin  with  expected  value  theory,  which  failed  although  it  often  seems  intuitively  compelling.  The 
expected  value  of  a  given  choice  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the  probability  of  each  potential  outcome  by  its  monetary 
equivalent,  and  then  summing  across  all  of  possible  outcomes.  ln  many  cases,  people  do  not  use  expected  values  in 
making  their  choices,  nor  do  they  think  that  they  should.  The  expected  value  of  insurance  is  negative,  yet  purchasing  it  is 
not  always  irrational.  Expected  values  are  also  often  ignored  when  given  choices  between  positive  outcomes.  Consider 
the  following  problem: 
Problem  3:  l7te gamble  is determined  by  tosses  of a fair  coin.  On the first  jlip,  a  tail  em&  the  game  and  you 
receive  nothing,  but  a  head  gives  $2  and  the  opportunity  to flip  again.  Every  time  you Jip  another  head,  your 
cmh  prize  for  that  round  is double  that  of  the previous  one.  l%e gamble  ends  the first  time  the  coin  comes  up 
tai&.  which  would  your  prefer:  (A) to play  the  gamble,  or  (B) $l,CXW,&W? 
The  expected  value  of  the  gamble,  called  the  St.  Petersburg  paradox,  is  infimite:  l/2  x  $2  +  l/4  x $4  +  l/8  x  $8  +  . . . . 
ad  infmitum.  People  are  rarely  willing  to  forgo  even  $100  to  play. 
Bernoulli  argued  that  people  could  rationally  reject  the  St.  Petersburg  gamble  because  there  is  no  reason  that 
monetary  value  (i.e.,  $x)  and  psychological  utility  (i.e.,  U($x))  need  be  perfectly  related.  (Utility  is  the  economists’  term 
for  units  of  satisfaction  or  happiness.)  ln  fact,  because  for  most  people  the  per  dollar  increase  in  utility  appears  to  decline 
as  dollar  values  grow  larger,  utility  theory  predicts  that  people  are  generally  risk  averse.  Suppose  one  has  a  choice 
between  (A)  a  certain  $10  million  and  (B)  an  even  chance  of  $20  million  or  nothing.  To  calculate  which  option  to  choose, 
7 one  must  multiply  the  utilities  of  each  possible  outcomes  by  the  probability  of  that  outcome,  and  then  choose  the 
alternative  that  yields  the  highest  sum.  Conse+ently,  the  choice  in  this  example  depends  on  which  is  larger,  1.0  x 
U($lOM)  or  0.5  x U($O)  +  U($2OM).  Most  people  seem  to  feel  that  getting  $10  million  would  make  them  about  as 
happy  as  they  can  get.  Setting  no  money  to  zero  utility  and  $10  million  to  ten  units  of  utility,  $20  million  might  rate  only 
a twelve.  If  so,  then  the  choice  should  be  Option  A  (i.e.,  10  >  6).  This  framework  can  also  explain  why  everyone  could 
be  rational  and  yet  not  make  the  same  choices,  for  it  allows  different  individuals  to  have  different  utilities  for  money. 
To  give  utility  theory  a fum  foundation,  several  theorists  have  attempted  to  derive  the  theory  from  a basic  set  of 
assumptions  or  axioms.  These  commonly  include  the  following:  Cancellation:  states  of  the  world  that  will  occur 
regardless  of  one’s  choice  should  not  affect  one’s  preferences.  If  one  prefers  A  to  B,  then  one  also  prefers  A+Z  to  B+Z. 
Transitivity:  it  is  possible  to  assign  each  option  a value  that  does  not  depend  on  the  other  available  options.  If  one 
prefers  A  to  B and  B to  C,  then  one  also  prefers  A  to  C.  This  assumption  is  necessary  so  that  options  can  be  ordered. 
Dominance:  if  one  choice  is better  along  at  least  one  dimension,  and  as  good  on  all  of  the  remaining  dimensions,  then  it 
will  be  most  preferred.  Invariance:  different  descriptions  of  the  same  choice  problem  should  all  yield  the  same  choice. 
Although  theories  of  rationality  can  be  derived  from  these  axioms,  none  of  them  describe  how  people  actually 
make  choices.  For  every  axiom  there  is  a  case  in  which  people’s  choices  systematically  violate  the  axiom.  The  first  case 
discovered  is  listed  below. 
Problem  4:  l’he Allais  Pam&ox 
Part  I:  Choose  A  or  B  Part  II:  Choose  C or D 
Gamble  A:  100%  chance  of  $lM  Gamble  C:  11%  chance  of  $IM 
89%  chance  of nothing 
Gamble  B:  89%  chance  of  $lM 
10%  chance  of  $5M 
1%  chance  of nothing 
Gamble  D:  10%  chance  of  $5M 
90%  chance  of nothing 
Most  people  prefer  A  over  B,  wishing  to  avoid  the  small  chance  of  getting  nothing.  People  also  prefer  D  over  C, 
showing  a  willingness  to  forgo  a  slightly  higher  probability  for  a  much  greater  potential  reward.  This  pattern  of  choices 
violates  the  cancellation  axiom  because  subtracting  a  89%  chance  of  $lM  from  A  and  from  B turns  them  into  C  and  D, 
respectively.  Consequently,  the  only  rational  choices  are  both  A  and  C  or  both  B and  D.  Even  utility  theorists  admit  that 
they  have  trouble  convincing  themselves  to  follow  either  theoretically  rational  course  of  action. 
8 B.  PROSPECT  THEORY 
The  most  widely  accepted  descriptive  theory  of  choice  is  Kahneman  and  Tversky’s  Prospect  Theory,  which  first 
appeared  in  Econometrica  in  1979.  Many  of  the  problems  presented  here  are  variations  of  those  invented  by  Kahneman 
and  Tversky.  There  are  many  components  to  the  theory,  and  only  the  most  important  aspects  will  be  described  here. 
According  to  the  theory,  there  are  three  important  properties  of  the  psychological  value  assessment  process. 
First,  individuals  view  monetary  outcomes  not  in  terms  of  absolute  wealth,  but  in  terms  of  changes  from  some  reference 
level,  which  is  often  the  status  quo.  Second,  there  are  not  only  diminishing  positive  psychological  returns  for  positive 
consequences,  but  also  diminishing  negative  psychological  returns  for  negative  consequences.  The  difference  between 
losing  $1  as  opposed  to  $5  is  not  perceived  as  severe  as  the  difference  between  losing  $501  as  opposed  to  $505.  Finally, 
the  resulting  psychological  value  function  is  steeper  for  losses  than  for  gains.  Finding  $10  is  less  of  a positive  change 
than  losing  $10  is  a negative  change.  (A  graph  of  a typical  value  function  appears  at  the  end  of  this  paper.) 
The  shape  of  the  value  function  has  several  important  implications  regarding  people’s  choices,  all  of  which  have 
since  been  substantiated  by  a  considerable  body  of  research.  First,  because  the  value  function  for  losses  is  convex,  people 
are  typically  risk  seeking  in  the  domain  of  losses,  the  opposite  of  their  behavior  in  the  domain  of  gains.  For  example, 
because  losing  $200  is  generally  not  twice  as  bad  as  losing  $100,  most  people  prefer  an  even  chance  of  losing  $200  or 
nothing  over  a certain  loss  of  $100.  Second,  because  the  curve  for  losses  is  steeper  than  the  curve  for  gains,  few  people 
will  accept  an  equal  chance  of  winning  or  losing  the  same  amount  when  the  stakes  are  high.  Thud,  the  largest 
psychological  change  per  monetary  unit  occurs  when  crossing  the  threshold  between  losses  and  gains.  The  psychological 
effects  of  all  other  $1  monetary  changes  pale  next  to  the  one  that  occurs  between  losing  $1  and  breaking  even.  Finally, 
because  people  often  allow  their  reference  points  to be  shifted  by  the  manner  in  which  the  particular  problem  is  described, 
their  choices  are  often  inconsistent  from  an  objective  standpoint.  In  Problem  I,  people  prefer  the  sure  option  when  the 
problem  is  framed  as  a  choice  between  two  gains  (i.e.,  lives  saved),  but  prefer  the  risky  option  when  the  problem  is 
framed  as  between  two  loses  (i.e.,  lives  lost). 
According  to  the  theory,  there  are  four  important  characteristics  regarding  how  people  weight  a  given  probability 
when  making  their  decisions.  First,  people  underweight  moderate  and  high  probabilities.  This  contributes  to  general  risk 
aversion  for  gains  and  risk  seeking  for  losses.  Second,  there  is  a  strong  psychological  change  from  high  probabilities  to 
certainty.  Consider  the  following  facetious  example.  Suppose  you  are  forced  to  play  Russian  roulette,  but  are  offered  a 
chance  to  pay  to  remove  one  bullet  from  the  gun.  Would  you  pay  more  if  there  were  two  bullets  in  the  gun  or  only  one? 
9 Although  both  purchases  increase  the  probability  of  living  by  the  same  percentage,  most  people  report  that  they  would  pay 
much  more  for  the  solo  bullet,  making  survival  a  certainty.  Third,  people  tend  to  treat  small  probabilities  as  if  they  were 
equivalent.  People  tend  to  prefer  an  .8  chance  of  winning  $SK  to  a  .4  of  winning  $9K,  yet  they  prefer  a  .0004  chance  of 
winning  $9K  to  a 0.0008  chance  of  winning  $.5K.  Not  all  2: 1 odds  are  created  equal.  Finally,  there  is  a tendency  to 
overweigh  small  probabilities.  Consequently,  people  are  generally  risk  seeking  in  the  domain  of  losses,  yet  wilhng  to 
insure  themselves  against  unlikely  disasters.  This  aspect  of  the  probability  weight  function  underlies  the  inconsistency 
shown  in  the  Allais  paradox.  Improbable  gains  and  losses  both  loom  large.  (A  graph  of  a typical  probability  weight 
function  appears  at  the  end  of  the  paper.) 
C. FFtAMING EFFECTS 
Prospect  theory  divides  the  decision  making  process  in  two  parts:  a phase  during  which  the  available  prospects  are 
“framed”  (i.e.,  put  into  a particular  perspective)  and  edited,  and  then  a phase  of  evaluation  and  choice,  which  was 
described  in  the  previous  section.  The  first  part  is  controlled  by  norms  and  habits  as  well  as  the  manner  in  which  the 
problem  is  presented.  Different  editing  processes  may  occur  depending  on  how  a particular  set  of  choices  is  framed, 
causing  preferences  to  shift.  Several  such  framing  effects  have  been  explored. 
First,  frames  can  affect  choice  by  inlluencing  where  the  reference  point  is  set.  Consider  the  difference  between 
discounts  and  surcharges.  A  price  difference  in  favor  of  L(ow)  over  H(igh)  can  be  framed  as  an  advantage  of  L by 
making  H  the  neutral  reference  point  or  as  a disadvantage  of  H by  making  L the  neutral  reference  point.  If  L  is  the 
neutral  reference  point,  then  the  price  difference  will  be  seen  as  L  minus  H,  that  is,  as  a  loss.  If  H  is  the  neutral 
reference  point,  then  the  price  difference  will  be  seen  as  H  minus  L,  that  is,  as  a gain.  Because  the  loss  function  is 
steeper  than  the  gain  function,  an  identical  difference  will  not  be  perceived  the  same  in  the  two  different  frames.  Consider 
what  might  have  happened  to  the  use  credit  cards  if the  price  difference  between  credit  and  cash  gas  purchases  had  been 
labeled  as  a credit  card  surcharge,  rather  than  a cash  discount. 
Setting  the  reference  point  can  also  influence  whether  people  are  risk  seeking  or  averse.  Investment  problems  are 
somewhat  more  complicated  than  those  presented  thus  far  because  most  risky  financial  instruments  are  best  described  by  a 
continuum  of  possible  returns  rather  than  by  discrete  outcomes,  but  consider  the  following: 
Problem  5: 
Frame  I: An  investor  is presented  with  two  choices:  She  can pick  either  Option  A,  which  is  certain  to 
make  money  this  year,  or  Option  B,  which  has  a  67%  chance  of  making  money  this  year. 
10 Frame  II: An  investor  is presented  with  two  choices:  She  can pick  either  Option  C,  which  is  certain 
to  make  less  than  15%  this  year,  or  Option  D,  which  has  a  40%  chance  of making  less  than  15 %  this 
year. 
The  first  frame  describes  the  choice  in  terms  of  gains  (i.e.,  returns  greater  than  O%),  which  would  be  expected  to  increase 
the  preference  for  the  certain  option,  say,  T-Bills  over  a portfolio  of  small  firm  stocks.  In  contrast,  the  second  frame 
describes  the  choice  in  terms  of  losses  (i.e.,  returns  less  than  15X),  which  would  be  expected  to  increase  the  preference 
for  the  riskier  choice,  say,  a portfolio  of  small  firm  stocks  over  T-Bills. 
Second,  frames  can  make  the  likelihood  of  a  rare  event  appear  relatively  large  by  segmenting  the  possible  causes 
of  that  event  into  s&components.  For  example,  the  collective  decision  weight  associated  with  four  probabilities  of  .Ol 
generally  exceeds  that  of  a  single  probability  of  .04  because  of  the  tendency  to  treat  all  small  probabilities  as  equal. 
Consider  the  following  example: 
Problem  6:  You have  a  chance  to  buy  high  yield  bonds  in a small  chemical  company.  Your  return  is 
certain  unless  a  leak  occurs  at  the  company  s  plant,  in which  case  liability  suits  against  the  company  will 
cause  you  to  lose  your  entire  investment. 
Frame  I:  “Experts  agree  that  the  current  probability  of a  leak  due  to  all factors  is  4%.  ” 
Frame  II:  “Experts  agree  that  there  are four  factors  that  can  lead  to  a  leak,  each  of which  has  a  1% 
chance  of  occurring:  (i) total failure  of the  main  coolant  pump,  (ii)  cracks  in the  sealing  gaskets  caused 
by  sudden  changes  in weather  condition,  (iii)  human  operator  error,  and  (iv)  malfunction  in the  electrical 
control  system.  ” 
People  weigh  the  risk  of  failure  higher  if  the  way  the  system  can  fail  is  divided  into  its  subcomponents.  Further 
subdivision  increases  the  effect  (e.g.,  “The  main  coolant  pump  can  fail  due to  sudden  changes  in  demand,  an  accidental 
severing  of  the  wiring,  failure  of  its  reserve  electrical  system,  or  insufficient  lubricant.“)  This  divide  and  conquer  strategy 
was  effectively  used  by  activists  to  rally  protest  against  the  construction  of  new  nuclear  power  plants. 
Finally,  frames  can  affect  choice  by  making  uncertain  outcomes  appear  certain.  These  “pseudo-certainty”  effects 
can  be  made  to  occur  if  a problem  is  described  as  occurring  in  stages  rather  than  solely  in  terms  of  the  full  outcomes. 
This  is  illustrated  in  the  next  two  problems. 
Problem  7: 
A  company  is competing  for  a government  contract.  You have  the  option  of  receiving  one  of  the 
following  two  securities: 
Security  A  has  a  25 % chance  of paying  $3ooO and  a  75%  chance  of paying  nothing. 
Security  B has  a  20%  chance  of paying  $4500  and  a  80%  chance  of paying  nothing. 
Approximately  four  out  of  five  people  choose  Security  B. 
11 Problem  8: 
A  company  ir competing  for  a government  contract.  The probability  that  the  company  will  not  receive 
the  contract  is  7.5%, in which  case  both  of options  below  will  yield  nothing.  If the  company  does  win  the 
contract,  then: 
Security  C will  pay  $3ooO for  certain. 
Security  D  hag a  80%  chance  of paying  $4500  and  a  20%  chance  of paying  nothing. 
YOU  MUST  CHOOSE  NOW,  BEFORE  THE  WINNER  OF  THE  CON7RACT  IS ANNOUNCED. 
Approximately  three  out  of  four  people  choose  Security  C.  Because  there  is  a 25%  chance  that  the  contract  will  be  won, 
Security  C  has  a  25%  chance  of  yielding  $3000,  and  Security  D  has  a 20%  chance  of  yielding  $4500  (i.e.,  .25  x  .80). 
Although  securities  A  and  C  are  functionally  identical,  only  C  is  preferred.  The  payoff  for  C  appears  to  be  certain, 
although  it  is  not,  because  the  frame  provided  in  Problem  8 encourages  people  to  ignore  the  uncertainty  in  the  initial 
stage,  which  is  common  to  both  choices. 
D.  BEUBISTICS  AND  BIASES  IN  INTUITIVE  FORECASTING 
Probabilities  in  the  problems  above  are  stated  precisely,  which  is  rarely  the  case  in  the  real  world.  Rather, 
probabilities  must  usually  be  estimated  from  a  set  of  noisy  and  vague  variables.  People  use  many  cognitive  heuristics, 
mental  rules  of  thumb,  to  make  these  estimates.  These  heuristics  allow  estimates  to  be  made  rapidly,  expending  a 
minimum  of  cognitive  effort.  The  two  heuristics  that  have  received  the  most  research  attention  will  be  described  here.  Of 
the  dozens  of  heuristics  that  have  appeared  in  the  risk  literature,  most  are  variations  of  these  two. 
1) THE  AVAILABILITY  HEUBISTIC:  Judgments  of  relative  frequency  or  of  the  likelihood  of  a future  event 
are  often  made  by  assessing  the  degree  to  which  the  event  is  available--perceptually,  in  memory,  or  via  construction  from 
imagination.  This  heuristic  is  often  accurate,  but  there  are  many  factors  that  are  uncorrelated  with  frequency  that  affect 
perceptual  salience,  the  completeness  with  which  we  recall,  or  the  degree  to  which  something  can  be  imagined. 
The  availability  heuristic  can  lead  to biased  likelihood  estimates  because  some  information  is  highly  salient.  The 
media  present  biased  samples  because  they  must  focus  on  the  sensational  and  ignore  statistically  frequent  (i.e.,  boring) 
events.  Rarity  and  newsworthiness  are  much  the  same.  However,  this  biased  sample  of  information  causes  people  to 
overestimate  the  frequencies  of  uncommon  events.  For  example,  the  media  report  every  suspected  case  of  death  by 
botulism,  but  rarely  report  death  by  diabetes.  Although,  the  true  ratio  is  approximately  1 to  10,000,  research  has  shown 
that  the  number  of  deaths  per  year  caused  by  botulism  and  by  diabetes  are  commonly  estimated  as  being  equal.  Similarly, 
12 bankruptcy  of  a major  corporation  is  newsworthy,  but  non-bankruptcy  is  not.  Even  experienced  investors  overestimate  the 
frequency  with  which  major  corporations  suffer  bankruptcy. 
Availability  from  memory  often  leads  to  overconfidence  in judgment.  Consider  the  following  question:  Which 
company  employs  more  people,  Mobil  or  Chrysler. 9  Even  when  rewarded  for  understating  the  probability  that  they  have 
answered  correctly,  people  greatly  overstate  the  likelihoods  that  their  answers  to  such  questions  are  correct.  The 
information  one  is  missing  is  rarely  given  sufficient  weight  in  balancing  the  confidence  judgment.  Memory  induced  biases 
can  also  occur  when  reasoning  about  a  single  case.  How  does  an  analyst  decide  whether  a  particular  company  is  likely  to 
show  high  levels  of  growth?  A  common  intuitive  strategy  for  making  this  type  of judgment  is  to  recall  similar  cases  and 
then  base  the  likelihood  estimate  on  the  percentage  of  these  available  cases  in  which  there  was  also  high  growth. 
Unfortunately,  irrelevant  factors  can  bias  retrieval  by  activating  a narrow  set  of  associative  links.  For  example,  an 
analysis  performed  on  an  the  anniversary  of  a  significant  historical  event  may  lead  to  high  levels  of  recall  from  that  time 
period.  If  the  economic  conditions  that  held  then  are  significantly  different  from  those  of  the  present,  biased  estimates 
would  be  expected. 
Reasoning  by  the  use  of  cases  and  scenarios  is  rarely  efficient  because  only  a portion  of  the  obtainable  information 
is  used.  An  effect  called  the  “hindsight”  bias  appears  due  to  the  fact  that  some  scenarios  may  be  much  easier  to  construct 
than  others.  People  consistently  exaggerate  what  could  have  been  anticipated  in  foresight.  Even  recall  of  past  predictions 
is  systematically  distorted.  The  hindsight  bias  generally  occurs  because  the  scenario  that  one  believes  led  to  the  actual 
event  becomes  so  compelling  that  it becomes  difficult  construct  or  imagine  the  alternative  scenarios  that  would  have  led  to 
different  outcomes.  This  bias  causes  difficulty  in  learning  from  history.  Success  or  failure  appears  inevitable  once  the 
outcome  is  known. 
2)  REPRESENTATIVENESS.  The  representativeness  heuristic  is  a cognitive  rule  in  which  judgments  are  made 
by  the  degree  of  similarity.  Causal  judgments  are  often  made  as  a function  of  the  similarity  between  the  cause  and  the 
actual  outcomes,  such  as  the  magnitude  of  the  possible  causes  and  the  magnitude  of  the  effect.  People  initially  had 
difficulty  accepting  that  something  small  enough  to  be  invisible,  such  as  a  virus,  could  cause  a deadly  disease.  The  use  of 
the  representativeness  heuristic  also  makes  it difficult  for  people  to  recognize  when  events  are  the  result  of  a  random 
process.  Judgments  of  similarity  can  readily  be  made  from  small  samples.  People  tend  to  expect  that  every  part  of  a 
sequence,  no  matter  how  small,  should  appear  “random,”  leading  to  what  is  known  as  the  Gambler’s  Fallacy.  When 
flipping  a coin,  the  average  number  of  tails  or  heads  in  a  row  is  two.  Expecting  every  part  of  any  sequence  of  coin  flips 
13 to  reflect  this  feature,  after  two  heads  have  been  flipped,  people  act  as  if  a  tail  is,  as  it were,  overdue.  However,  if  a  tail 
does  not  appear  for  four  more  flips--as  is  likely  to  occur  once  in  any  given  sequence  of  100  tosses--then  people  begin  to 
reject  the  notion  that  the  coin  is  fair.  Similarly,  it is  cliff%xlt  for  people  to  accept  the  degree  to  which  stock  price  changes 
are  determined  by  a  random  process. 
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